Orthopoxviruses
The monkeypox virus is a poxivrrus of the orthopoxvirus group. Members of this group include smallpox (variola), vaccinia, buffalopox, camelpox, cowpox, rabbitpox, raccoonpox, gerbilpox, and others (Zajtchuk, 1997) . Because these viruses are genetically similar, some are cross species transmissible. This means they can be passed from one species to another. Although smallpox has not been found naturally in any species other than humans, other members of the orthopox group are known to be transmissible to other species, including humans. The transmission of cowpox from cows to milkmaids was the discovery that led Edward Jenner to the development of a vaccination for smallpox in the 1790s (Zajtchuk, 1997) . Cross species transmission is thought to be the source of the monkeypox cases seen in the United States.
Because of the similarity of their genetic makeup, infection with one orthopoxvirus imparts immunity to the others. Vaccination with the vaccinia virus used for smallpox protection also provides protection to other orthopox viruses, including monkeypox (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [USDHHS 1, 200 I) .
Mode of Infection
Monkeypox is transmitted primarily through direct contact and respiratory droplet spread, similar to smallpox. Airborne transmission of the monkeypox virus cannot be excluded, especially from individuals presenting with cough (USDHHS, 2oo3b) .
During the 1981 to 1986 evaluations of monkeypox cases in Africa, human to human transmission of monkeypox was documented. This study indicated human to human transmission was limited to one or two generations (Fenner, 1989) .Generation is the term used to describe how far a disease is spread from the original source. The original source is the first generation. If the original source passed it on to another, that is the second generation, and so on. Subsequent investigations of monkeypox outbreaks in 1996 to 1997 indicated the number of generations of cases of human to human transmission might be higher than the earlier study showed. The increase in human to human transmission noted from 1996 to 1997 is thought to be caused by the cessation of the smallpox vaccination program in the I970s. Cessation of the smallpox vaccination program left more individuals susceptible to orthopox infection (USDHHS, 1997) .
Clinical Features
Prior to the 2003 U.S. cases of rnonkeypox, all information about the disease came from the cases studied in Africa. Investigation of human monkeypox cases in Africa found that monkeypox in humans closely resembles ordinary type and occasionally modified type smallpox, although generally of a less severe nature. As of 1986, no cases of monkeypox that compared with flat type or hemorrhagic type smallpox had been detected (Fenner, 1989) . One clinical feature found in monkeypox that is not found in smallpox is pronounced lymph node enlargement. Lymph node enlargement was found in 90% of cases examined in which the presence or absence of node enlargement was documented. The enlargement of the lymph nodes begins early in the disease process, usually I to 3 days prior to the onset of the rash (Fenner, 1989) .
The incubation period for monkeypox is approximately 12 days from exposure. Around the 12th day after exposure, the prodromal phase of the illness consisting of fever, prostration, and usually lymph node enlargement begins. The prodromalphase lasts I to 3 days. Following the prodromal phase, skin eruptions begin. As with smallpox, the skin eruptions develop on the body at the same rate. Eruptions move from papules, to vesicles, and finally into pustules. Eruption distribution is mainly on the extremities, and can include the palms and soles of the feet. Lesions have also been noted on the oral mucosa and tongue. The eruptions scab over and eventually fall off. The course of the disease is usually during a 2 to 3 week period (Fenner, 1989) .
Information from evaluation of individuals in Africa also indicates subclinical cases of monkeypox can also occur. In the subclinical cases, antibodies were detected in individuals who did not show outward signs of the disease. African cases also indicate documented immunization may not fully protect against monkeypox because monkeypox was detected in individuals with observable vaccinia scars (Fenner, 1989) .
CASES

First Cases
On May II, 2003, a family from central Wisconsin visited an animal swap meet in Wausau, Wisconsin. The family purchased two prairie dogs to take back to their hobby farm as pets. On May 13, the family's 3Y2 year old daughter was bitten on the right index finger and the back of the left hand by one of the prairie dogs. The prairie dog was taken to a local veterinarian on May 15 to be evaluated for skin lesions and a discharge from its eyes and nose. During this visit, the prairie dog bit the veterinary technician (Melski, 2(03) .
By May 16, the 3Y2-year-old child had developed a fever and her bite wounds were red. On May 20, the sick prairie dog died and an enlarged submandibular lymph gland was sent to the Marshfield Clinic veterinary laboratory in Marshfield Wisconsin for evaluation. On the same day, the child was taken to the Marshfield Clinic, Colby/Abbotsford Wisconsin Center. The bite lesions on her finger and hand were noted to be whitish and raised. The child also had upper respiratory infection symptoms. She was started on APRIL 2004, VOL. 52, NO.4 amoxicillin/clavulanate potassium (Augmentin) and azithromycin (Zithromax) (Melski, 2(03) .
As a result of the child's increasing symptoms, a pediatric infectious disease physician at the Marshfield Clinic in Marshfield Wisconsin examined the child on May 22. The child was subsequently admitted to a local hospital in Marshfield with festering wounds, fever, right eye discharge, swelling, and widespread skin lesions (Melski, 2(03) . On May 24th, the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services, Division of Public Health (DPH) was notified of the case. Also on this date, a gram negative bacillus was isolated from the lymph node of the deceased prairie dog. This finding lead to the suspicion that the disease in the child might be tularemia or plague (Reed, 2(03).
A dermatologist examined the child on May 25. The dermatologist documented central darkened crusts with pustular borders at the site of the finger and hand bites. The disseminated papulovesicles and pustules had erythematous flares with central umbilications. A biopsy of the lesion was performed and sent to the lab for evaluation. All tests for strains of herpes and varicella viruses were negative (Melski, 2003) .
The child's mother was seen at the Marshfield Clinic in Marshfield, Wisconsin on May 27. She presented with vesicles on her right hand, drenching sweats, and a sore throat. By the next day, the mother had disseminated skin lesions and more sweating. However, she was afebrile and felt better. On May 29, a biopsy was conducted on the mother's primary lesion and the child was discharged home. On May 31, the father of the child developed malaise, sweats, and multiple skin lesions (Melski, 2(03) .
On June 2nd, the Wisconsin DPH was notified that the Marshfield Clinic laboratory had electron microscopic evidence of a poxivirus in the skin lesion of the child's mother. By June 4, the Marshfield laboratory, using electron microscopy, had visualized and identified the poxivirus as an orthopox virus. The DPH was notified of this finding and arranged confirmatory testing of the tissue and biopsy specimens by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC, using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing, confirmed the findings on June 6 and revealed the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) signature was that of monkeypox (Reed, 2003) .
Occupational Health Involvement
The Employee Health and Safety department at Marshfield Clinic provides employee health, safety, and infection control services for the Marshfield Clinic system. On June 6th, the department was notified of the CDC-confirmed diagnosis of monkeypox. Following protocols previously established to identify employees exposed to active tuberculosis (TB) cases, the Employee Health and Safety department identified all areas of the Clinic where patients with monkeypox had been seen. Managers of these areas were contacted to identify all employees who might have had direct contact with the patients. An email was sent to notify these employees of their possible exposure and the signs and symptoms of which they needed to be aware.
Although it was relatively easy to identify the employees in the Clinic who had direct contact with the individu-als diagnosed with monkeypox, it was learned that no record was kept of the Clinic residents and medical students who may have seen the child while she was in the hospital. Information was disseminated to notify this employee population about signs and symptoms to be aware of and to report any symptoms to Employee Health and Safety.
On June 12, an employee who was the medical assistant of the pediatric infectious disease physician was contacted at her home. The employee had not responded to the initial email. The medical assistant reported she had held the child during her initial visit to the Clinic and had been out sick when the email was sent. She had been running a fever for 2 days and had an ulceration in her oral cavity. After consultation with one of the Clinic Infectious Disease physicians, it was agreed that the employee should stay at home and monitor her symptoms. Arrangements were also made to have an occupational health nurse from the Employee Health and Safety department visit the employee and obtain a blood sample. The Employee Health and Safety department staff was asked to visit the employee because the staff was trained in infection control and had previously been fitted with full face, High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA), Powered Air Purifying Respirators (PAPR). The occupational health nurse used the respirator and wore disposable gown and gloves to visit the employee, document her condition, and draw blood specimens.
During the home visit, it was learned the employee's boyfriend also had a slight fever and had red papules on his right arm. After consultation with both Clinic infectious disease and dermatology physicians, it was decided that both the employee and her boyfriend should be seen at the Clinic to evaluate the symptoms.
Arrangements were made to have the employee and her boyfriend come to the Clinic at the end of the day and enter through a back entrance. Both individuals were provided with isolation masks and escorted to the Infectious Disease department's negative pressure room. The examining infectious disease physician used contact and respiratory isolation practices, including disposable gown, gloves, full face shield and N95 respirator (i.e., a respirator that filters particles I micron in size with a filter efficiency of > 95 %). Members of this department had previously been fitted with N95 respirators as part of the Clinic TB program. The examining dermatology physician had not previously been fitted with an N95 respirator and had facial hair. He was fitted with a full face PAPR along with a disposable gown and gloves. It is interesting to note that the dermatologist needed to use a binocular eye loop to better visualize the papules. This unit fit well under the full facepiece of the PAPR.
Biopsies of the employee's boyfriend's skin lesions of the were obtained along with a blood sample. These specimens were evaluated at the Clinic's lab. Samples were also sent to the Wisconsin State laboratory and to the CDC. Wisconsin DPH officials were also notified of the possible cases. The employee and her boyfriend were told to return home and await instructions from public health officials. Both were advised to not visit or see anyone else. Because of the potential of transmission back to animals, the employee's boyfriend was told not to report to his job as a milker on a dairy farm.
Because the employee had contact only with the infected child and not the infected prairie dog, it was surmised that she might have contracted monkeypox from human to human transmission. The Wisconsin DPH reported it was also investigating another potential case of human to human transmission of monkeypox in another part of the state.
Quarantine Issues
Because of the potential for human to human transmission of monkeypox, the Wisconsin DPH advised the employee and her boyfriend they needed to stay in quarantine for 12 days and until test results returned from the CDC. The employee and her boyfriend were restricted to their house and yard, and were not to have contact with neighbors or others.
The Clinic's workers' compensation carrier was notified of the case because the employee was working in her role as a medical assistant when she had contact with the patient with monkeypox. Workers' compensation was subsequently denied when it was determined that she did not have monkeypox. The issue of whether an employee quarantined for a suspected work related exposure to a disease should receive workers' compensation coverage when no disease actually occurs is an issue that needs to be evaluated and determined by each state. Occupational health nurses may want to clarify this issue in their states. Marshfield Clinic also agreed to cover any lost wages for the employee. The employee's boyfriend was independently employed and did not have benefits to cover his time away from work.
The issue of having individuals in quarantine, who do not have any source of income during the period of quarantine, needs evaluation at the state and federal level. If funding is not available to take care of individuals placed in quarantine, the likelihood of these individuals reporting symptoms and staying in quarantine may be jeopardized. A solution to this problem could be to allow individuals placed in quarantine by public health officials to collect state unemployment benefits. This means changing the rules relating to the collection of unemployment benefits in many, if not all, states.
During the period of quarantine, the Clinic's occupational health nurses made contact with the employee and her boyfriend twice a day to check on their health and to assist with any needs they might have. This was in addition to contacts they received from local public health nurses. The need for a support system for quarantined individuals is something that should be discussed with local public health officials prior to the need for these services. Occupational health nurses may also want to discuss developing an employee support system with their organization's management in preparation for workers who may be quarantined as a result of contact with infectious individuals.
The employee and her boyfriend did not show any increase in formal signs and symptoms of the disease throughout their 12 day quarantine and were subsequently allowed to return to their regular employment. Tests performed by the CDC on biopsy and blood specimens of the employee and her boyfriend were negative for monkeypox. Although multiple attempts were made, the Employee Health and Safety department was not initially able to get formal confirmation about the specimen results from the CDC. The DPH also had difficulty in obtaining formal test results from the CDC. This issue was discussed with state officials and is currently being addressed. Systems and specific contacts to communicate lab results and other information to all groups in need of the information should be planned for prior to an actual event.
Vaccination
On June 16, the CDC gave approval for the Wisconsin DPH to offer vaccinia virus vaccine to individuals with direct exposure to patients, animals, and lab specimens infected with monkeypox. State immunization teams that had recently been set up to provide vaccination of health care personnel against smallpox, were now activated to administer the vaccinia virus vaccine on a voluntary basis to exposed individuals. This may have been the first time vaccinia virus was used in the United States to prevent the spread of a non-smallpox virus.
Because the incubation period for monkeypox was reported as an average of 12 days, it was determined that employees with a possible exposure to patients with monkeypox, animals, or lab specimens in the prior 14 days would be offered the vaccinia virus vaccination. Because the vaccination was voluntary and most of the Clinic employees with contact to the patients and specimens handled in the Marshfield Clinic were outside of the 14 day window, only four Clinic employees were vaccinated. The Employee Health and Safety department monitored the vaccinated employees following CDC guidelines (USDHHS, 2001) . A normal course of reaction was observed and documented in all vaccinated employees. No adverse reactions were found.
INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSE OF THE U.S. OUTBREAK
Between April 15 and May 17, a distributor of exotic animals from the southeastern part of Wisconsin obtained 39 prairie dogs from a distributor in northeastern lIlinois. On May 3, the Wisconsin distributor agreed to transport a sick Gambian giant rat from the lIlinois distributor to an exotic animal veterinarian in Wisconsin. The Gambian giant rat had recently been exported from Ghana along with a shipment of dormice to the lIlinois distributor. Along with the Gambian giant rat, 15 prairie dogs and 94 other animals, including the dormice, were transported by the Wisconsin distributor to his facility. The rat subsequently died and no specific cause of death was determined upon necropsy. The carcass was incinerated. Prairie dogs from the Wisconsin distributor were sold to two separate pet stores (Reed, 2003) .
In the July 11,2003 issue of Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, the CDC (USDHHS, 2oo3c) reported A total of 93 infected or potentially infected prairie dogs were traced from IL-l [I1Iinois animal distributor] to six states. In addition, an unknown numberof prairiedogs died or were reportedly sold (as pets for APRIL 2004, VOL. 52, NO.4 sale or exchange) at animal swap meets for which no records were available for tracing. Trace back investigations identified a Texas animal distributor who had imported a shipment of approximately 800 small mammals from Ghana on April 9. The shipment included 762 African rodents, including rope squirrels, tree squirrels, Gambian giant rats, brushtail porcupines, dormice, and striped mice. The CDC tested some of these animals and confirmed the presence of monkeypox in several rodent species, including one Gambian rat, three dormice, and two rope squirrels (USDHHS, 2003c) .
Information on the Cause ofthe Outbreak
A total of 71 potential cases of monkeypox were reported in the United States between May 15 and the last reported case on June 20, 2003. (The CDC final report on the number of cases of monkeypox lists the total reported cases as 72 [USDHHS, 2003a] .) Of the 71 potential cases reported, 37 cases were actually confirmed by the CDC. The 71 cases were reported as being from (USDHHS, 2003c) (1).
According to the CDC: Of the 71 cases, 39 (55%) occurred among females. The median age of those infected was 28 years (range: 1 to 51 years). Age data were unavailable for one patient. Among 69 patients for whom data were available, 18 (26%) were hospitalized; some patients were hospitalized for isolation precautions only. Two patients, both children, had serious clinical illness. Both of these patients recovered without any documented residual problems. The majority of patients weredirectly exposedto prairiedogs. Some of the 71 cases were exposed in premises where prairie dogs were kept. Others were exposed to individuals with monkeypox. No patients havebeenconfirmed to have had exposure to individuals with monkeypox as their only possible exposure (USDHHS, 2003c) .
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURSING IMPLICATIONS
Recent and ongoing disease outbreaks in the world raise the potential for occupational health nurses to be called on to continue to play an important role in the prevention, detection, and follow up of infectious diseases.
The U.S. monkeypox cases involved a number of issues occupational health nurses can, and do address in the course of their duties. Exposure identification; employee notification; vaccination and vaccination monitoring programs; respiratory protection programs; employee education; and interaction with local, state, and federal public health agencies by occupational health nurses were an integral part in assuring that the outbreak of monkeypox in the United States was limited and controlled.
SUMMARY
Between May 15 and June 20, 2003, 71 suspected cases of monkey pox were investigated and 37 individuals
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An Occupational Health Look atthe First Cases Cunha, B.£. 2 Monkeypox is in the same family as smallpox and other orthopoxviruses. Signs and symptoms are similar to smallpox, with the most significant exception that monkeypox typically causes pronounced lymph node enlargement.
3 Programs implemented byoccupational health nurses were used to protect health care workers who treated patients with monkeypox. These programs included respiratory protection, exposure identification, and immunization follow up programs.
One Clinic employee was thought to potentially have monkeypox because of her direct contact with one of the patients. Four Clinic employees were vaccinated with vaccinia vaccine as a result of their contact with patients or lab specimens.
Quarantine of the potentially infected employee and her boyfriend uncovered issues that must be addressed if other infectious diseases requiring quarantine or isolation of individuals emerge or re-emerge. These include a system to compensate individuals in quarantine or isolation who do not have any other source of income. The issue of whether workers' compensation should cover an employee who is quarantined or isolated for a potential work related exposure to an infectious disease if no disease is actually diagnosed also needs to be explored.
A better system of getting state or CDC laboratory results back to the local level, including the occupational health area of the generating facility, must be developed. This will be very important if diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) or smallpox should re-emerge in the United States.
Occupational health nurses are an integral part of any infectious disease process occurring in the United States. The identification of monkeypox in the United States shows that any planning to detect, prevent, and treat diseases with the potential to affect the employee population must include occupational health nurse involvement. AAOHN ]ouma12004; 52(4), 164-168. Monkeypox was first discovered inanimals in1958 and first identified in humans in 1970. In May 2003, physicians atthe Marshfield Clinic inWisconsin identified the first cases of human monkeypox inthe United States. 1 4 Occupational health nurses must be involved in preparation for infectious diseases that could affect the work population. Early preparation to address the needs of the working population who may be exposed to infectious diseases require coordinations between occupational health nurses and government agencies such as the public health department.
in the United States developed laboratory confirmed monkeypox. These were the first cases of human monkeypox ever documented in the United States or in the Western Hemisphere. The disease was transmitted from small animals imported from Africa to other animals, including prairie dogs sold as pets throughout the U.S. Midwest. Direct contact with the infected animals was the method of infection, and although human to human transmission was thought to have occurred, this was not confirmed by follow up testing.
Because of the link with contact with a prairie dog, initial evaluation of the disease was focused toward diseases commonly associated with this animal (e.g., tularemia, plague). Laboratory findings at the Marshfield Clinic in Marshfield, Wisconsin pointed to the presence of an orthopox. The CDC confirmed monkeypox was the infecting orthopox agent.
Occupational health nurses from the Marshfield Clinic had direct involvement in the identification and follow up of employees who had direct contact with the diagnosed patients. Programs, such as a respiratory protection program initiated and carried out by Clinic occupational health nurses, were used to prevent employee exposure for Clinic staff.
